# The Crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh

As of July 2017, the unrecognized state at greatest risk of violence is Ngorno-Karabahk. What insights does our model offer there?

In April 2016, violence flared up at the border between Karabakh and the home state of Azerbaijan. More than 200 people were killed over four days, and sporadic violence has continued since. As of June 2017, the International Crisis Group (ICC) deemed the risk of war to be greater than at any time since the 1994 ceasefire (ICC 2017); any such war would likely involve Karabakh’s patron, Armenia.

Given the military strength of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the task of enforcing any potential negotiated agreement between Karabakh and Azerbaijan is likely to be substantially more difficult for the international community than it was in South Sudan. Simply threatening to cut off foreign aid is unlikely to force either side to adhere to any agreement it sees an advantage in breaking.[[1]](#footnote-1) However, the international community may still be able to shift the payoffs of Karabakh and Azerbaijan enough to, at a minimum, prevent a return to war.

[EXPLAIN HOW THIS WOULD GO]

[[2]](#footnote-2)

1. Mediation of the Ngorno-Karabakh conflict is primarily undertaken by the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), which is co-chaired by the U.S., Russia, and France. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Armenia is a member of two Russian-led security pacts while Azerbaijan purchases 85% of their military equipment from Russia (Grono 2016) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)